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RISK MANAGEMENT 
FOR NONPROFITS
The 2015 bankruptcy of FEGS, the largest social service nonprofit in New York, shook the 
confidence of the city’s nonprofits. Coming in the wake of the turmoil at Cooper Union and 
the collapse of the New York City Opera, many trustees are asking new questions about the 
organizations they govern. What risks do we face?1 How risky are we in relation to our peers? 
Are we doing the right things to understand and mitigate our risks? How should we balance 
financial risk against programmatic reward? What should we do to reduce the potential 
hardships from financial distress?
Unfortunately, very few nonprofits have processes in place to address these issues of 
financial risk management. However, our research suggests that this can and must change.
 • New York City nonprofits are fragile: 10% are insolvent (18% in health and human 
services); as many as 40% have virtually no cash reserves (i.e., margin for error); and 
over 40% have lost money over the last three years. We believe that less than 30% are 
financially strong. Yet many trustees do not understand the financial condition of their 
organization or how it compares to its peers.
 • Distressed nonprofits have very limited ways to recover, so trustees must do all they can 
to reduce the risk that their organization becomes distressed in the first place. And they 
must take prompt, decisive action if it does.
 • Practices such as scenario planning, benchmarking and self-rating, and setting explicit 
financial stability targets, can improve risk management. A few organizations already do 
these things. Most do not.
We believe that the nonprofit sector can make dramatic improvements in risk management 
over the next few years – and bring more stability to vital programs. Institutions ranging from 
nonprofit umbrella groups to regulators, such as the Charities Bureau of the Office of the 
New York State Attorney General, also support better risk management.2 This report outlines 
concrete steps that organizations can take to manage risk better. These recommendations 
come from a study by SeaChange Capital Partners and Oliver Wyman on how to adapt 
private sector risk practices to nonprofits. It was motivated by recent failures and a concern 
that nonprofits face an increasing number of risks, including rising interest rates, the move 
to value-based payments in healthcare, and increased real estate costs. Organizations 
that don’t adopt better risk management may find themselves in an increasingly 
precarious situation.
1 By “risk” we mean unexpected events and factors that may have a material impact on an organization’s finances, operations, reputation, 
viability, and ability to pursue its mission.
2 The Human Services Council’s Commission on Nonprofit Closures’ recent report recommending a strong emphasis on risk 
management may be found at: http://www.humanservicescouncil.org/Commission/HSCCommissionReport.pdf.
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THE CONTEXT: STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES
Trustees often fail to appreciate the difficult conditions under which nonprofits operate. 
These conditions can be far more difficult than any they have seen before.
 • Tackling the hardest problems: Nonprofits address economically intractable and 
politically unappealing problems. This is true even though charities arose long before 
government social programs and have helped shape the public agenda.
 • Cost-minus funding: Most nonprofit funding, especially in health and human services, 
comes in the form of government contracts or restricted grants that virtually guarantee a 
deficit. Government contracts also create working capital needs because funding arrives 
after expenses are paid. These funds are also subject to unpredictable delays 
in payment.3
 • One-way bets: Nonprofits face contingent liabilities that can swamp them financially. 
These include claw-backs for disallowed expenses, after-the-fact audits, and unilateral 
retroactive rate reductions.
 • Zero-sum philanthropy: The total supply of philanthropy is largely fixed.4 Large 
organizations working in difficult issue areas will always be overwhelmingly reliant on 
government funding.
 • Cost disease: Nonprofits provide face-to-face, labor-intensive services that do not get 
more productive from technology. The real cost of these services has risen substantially 
over time and is likely to do so in the future.5
 • Recruiting and retention: Nonprofits face structural challenges in recruiting and 
retaining high-quality staff in finance, accounting, technology, and back-office functions. 
Factors driving this situation include the small size of many organizations, the challenge 
in providing career development, and competition from higher-paying for-profits.
 • Gales of creative destruction: Nonprofits operate in a dynamic environment. 
Challenges include demographics, funding fashions, political priorities, and real estate 
costs. The weak financial position of many nonprofits can make it difficult to respond.
It is no surprise that many nonprofits are always living close to the edge.
3 Advocates for the nonprofit sector are working to educate government about the risks these contracts impose on nonprofits and to 
advocate for changes. While trustees should hope that these efforts are successful, they cannot shirk their governance responsibility 
for risk management on the basis that “it’s the government’s fault.”
4 Philanthropy as a percentage of GDP has moved within a very tight band for at least the last 45 years 
(see https://philanthropy.com/article/The-Stubborn-2-Giving-Rate/154691), and philanthropy per nonprofit has actually fallen, 
as the number of nonprofits has grown faster than GDP and the population. Nevertheless, many nonprofits underinvest in development 
or have boards that do not recognize the vital role they must play in raising unrestricted funds.
5 See http://www.amazon.com/The-Cost-Disease-Computers-Cheaper/dp/0300179286 for a fuller explanation of this phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, many nonprofits could be more effective and efficient through better use of technology.
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THE PATH FORWARD: MORE ROBUST AND SYSTEMATIC 
RISK MANAGEMENT
Enterprise Risk Management in for-profit companies6 and our interviews with nonprofit 
leaders suggest a set of best practices for nonprofit risk management. They are in use at 
several leading nonprofits, and each one can make a real difference to any organization 
that adopts it.
1. Governance and Accountability for Risk Management: Oversight for risk 
management is part of the board’s legal duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. It should 
be an explicit responsibility of the audit and/or finance committee,7 with an appropriate 
dedication of time to the task. One leading organization reports that roughly 10% of total 
board discussion now revolves around risk. The committee responsible for risk must 
have direct communication with the finance function and with staff who have time to ask 
“What if?” It should report to and elicit input from the board as a whole. It should ensure 
that the board sets the right tone by communicating a commitment to risk management 
throughout the organization. This should be part of its strategy, culture, and pursuit of 
the mission.8 Organizations should develop an explicit risk tolerance statement. This is 
similar to mission and vision statements. It needs to indicate the limits for risk-taking and 
the willingness to trade short-term program impact for longer-term sustainability. 
A thoughtful risk tolerance statement will reduce the likelihood that an organization is 
either cavalier about risk or paralyzed by excessive risk aversion.
2. Scenario Planning: Organizations should keep a running list of the major risks they face. 
For each, they should indicate its likelihood and the expected loss (probably in terms 
of unrestricted net assets) if it occurs. Then they should consider actions to reduce the 
likelihood of it occurring and mitigate the damage if it does. The list may include a wide 
range of possible risks depending on the organization. Examples include lease renewal, 
cost overruns on a capital project, the non-renewal of an important funder, investment 
performance, and succession.
3. Recovery and Program Continuity Planning: Organizations should have plans for how 
to maintain service in the event of a financial disaster. Large organizations should also 
consider developing “living wills” to expedite program transfer. These living wills should 
be discussed in advance during stable times with government agencies and partners so 
everyone is prepared to act in a crisis.
6 For background see http://www.oliverwyman.com/what-we-do/financial-services/finance-risk.html and http://www.mmc.com/
global-risk-center/overview.html.
7 Some specialized risks – for example data/cybersecurity – might be located in other committees. Unlike financial institutions, even the 
largest nonprofits do not face the range of risks that would merit a dedicated “risk committee.”
8 For a discussion on the importance of “tone” and of risk management in the for-profit setting see http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/
wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.24301.15.pdf.
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4. Environmental Scan: On an annual basis, organizations should brief trustees about 
longer-term trends in the operating environment. They should consider the potential 
benefits of exploring various forms of organizational redesign in response, such as 
collaborations, mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, partnerships, outsourcing, 
managed dissolutions, and divestments.
5. Benchmarking and Self-rating: Organizations should compare their financial 
performance to peers on an annual basis using IRS 990 data.9 They should also ask 
umbrella groups to collect more detailed and timely information from the peer group. 
Another option is to use a self-rating tool to combine financial measures into an overall 
indicator of organizational health.
6. Financial Stability Targets: Organizations should have targets for operating results 
based on minimum and long-term needs. An example might be not having two 
consecutive years of deficits. They should also have targets for cash, unrestricted net 
assets, operating reserves, and access to credit. Trustees should develop contingency 
plans for when minimum targets are not met. Since earning the requisite capitalization 
is so difficult, organizations must think creatively about how to build the necessary 
reserves. Ideas might include one-time capital campaigns and pledged funds from 
trustees for use in a crisis. Organizations should put in place monitoring and governance 
processes to ensure that reserves are not inadvertently used to fund operating deficits.
7. Reporting and Disclosure: Larger organizations should summarize their financial 
and programmatic results in a short plain-English report similar to the management 
discussion and analysis section of the SEC’s Form 10-K. This report should also cover 
their opportunities and risks in the context of internal and external conditions. Creating 
this type of report would give a sense of urgency to the underlying processes. It 
could also help reassure stakeholders such as trustees, banks, and regulators that 
organizations are doing all they can to ensure long-run sustainability.
8. Board Composition, Qualifications, and Engagement: Risk management requires 
a functioning partnership between capable management and a critical mass of 
experienced, educated, and engaged trustees. Organizations serious about risk 
management must redouble their effort to recruit trustees with a wide range of 
experience.10 They need to empower high-functioning committees. They also need 
to ensure ongoing education for both new and existing trustees. Trustees cannot 
participate in intelligent risk management unless they understand important contracts 
and the associated processes for approval and registration. They also must know the 
distinction between direct/indirect and allowed/disallowed costs. Many organizations, 
particularly large complex ones, would benefit from having an experienced nonprofit 
executive on their board with firsthand experience of the programs and the associated 
funding streams.
Few nonprofit organizations will be able to implement all of these practices, but all will 
benefit from spending more time anticipating and preparing for risks.
9 Tools like the Non-Profit Finance Fund’s NFF Financial SCAN can help with this (see http://nonprofitfinancefund.org/financial-scan).
10 An engaged and experienced board can be difficult to build and maintain when fundraising is its primary duty.  Organizations must 
accept that they will always have some members who just “write checks.” Organizations like BoardSource and others have tools to help 
boards with self-assessment.
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THE SCALE OF THE CHALLENGE: HOW “RISKY” IS THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR?
Our analysis of the financial results of New York City nonprofits illustrates just how fragile 
many nonprofits are. It should provide useful context for trustees to understand their 
organization’s absolute and relative risk profile.
If New York City’s nonprofit sector were a single organization it would have revenues of 
$14.5 billion and a deficit (over the five years between 2009 and 2013) of -1.8% before 
investment income and asset sales.11 After investment income and asset sales, those 
margins rise to 3.4%.12 The aggregate figures suggest that things have been getting slightly 
better for the nonprofit sector taken as a whole.
There are three important measures of a nonprofits risk-bearing capacity that trustees 
should keep in mind: cash to cover immediate needs; unrestricted net assets as the best 
measure of a nonprofit’s “equity” that is available to bear losses or make investments; and 
operating reserves (the portion of the equity that is available in the short term).13 
In aggregate, the sector has cash, equity, and operating reserves equal to 2.9, 10.1, and 3.6 
months of expenses, respectively (based on 2013 figures). These cash and operating reserve 
ratios are well below the six-month level that nonprofit experts suggest is appropriate for 
many organizations.
The aggregate statistics conceal the very different circumstances facing individual 
organizations (and even entire sub-sectors) as becomes clear when the data 
are disaggregated.
 • More than 10% of the nonprofits are technically insolvent (i.e., their liabilities exceed 
their assets), including 18% in health and human services (in terms of service volume, 
these non-profits account for 8% and 11%, respectively.) Many of these organizations 
are limping from payroll to payroll with less than a month of cash, effectively borrowing 
from vendors (by delaying payment) and/or dipping into restricted funds. These 
organizations have no capital for investment and little ability to consider a thoughtful 
restructuring given the lack of resources to fund the associated one-time costs.
11 Based on a representative sample of approximately 1,335 nonprofits filing IRS Form 990s for which GuideStar has electronic data. 
This incudes all organizations with revenue of $1.0 million of more in each reporting year from 2009-2013, as well as a small fraction 
of smaller ones. We have excluded hospitals, medical research, organizations working abroad, higher education, private schools, and 
churches. See the appendix for more information.
12 The results of ResCare, a private equity-owned for-profit social service provider with high-powered incentives competing in a 
traditionally “non-profit” arena suggest that profit margins would only be a few points higher for large social service nonprofits if they 
were run to maximize profits. (See: http://seachangecap.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ResCare-Form-10-K-2013.pdf).
13 Calculated as net unrestricted assets less fixed assets. FMA and others call variations on this liquid unrestricted net assets (LUNA). 
See www.FMAonline.net.
5
 • Roughly, 40% of the organizations have virtually no margin for error, with cash 
and operating reserves of less than two months. (In terms of service volume, these 
organizations account for 36% in aggregate and 50% in health and human services.) 
Yet these figures actually overstate the real cushion for weaker organizations, since much 
of the available cash is restricted to certain purposes. At best, 20-40% of organizations 
appear to be financially strong, defined as having more than six months of unrestricted 
net assets.
 • The median nonprofit has earned an operating margin of -0.1% over the past three 
years (i.e., before investment income and asset sales.) The median margin rises to 
1% after consideration of these items, though 40-50% of the organizations have still lost 
money over the last three years.
 • Most nonprofits are small but the large ones provide the vast majority of services: 
50% are less than $2.4 million; 24% are between $2 and $5 million; and 80% are 
less than $10 million. Only 10% are $20 million or above.14 There are fewer than 50 
organizations of more than $50 million in the city.15 However, the smallest 50% of the 
organizations contributed only 5.6% of total service provision while the largest 5% 
provided almost 50%.
 • Nonprofits differ greatly in their reliance on philanthropy, but the majority of service 
provision comes from groups largely funded by the government. The median level of 
philanthropy is 32%. But roughly one-third of nonprofits receive more than 90% of their 
funding from the government. Nearly 80% of the largest human service organizations 
are 90%+ government-funded. When looked at by service volume, 53% of service is 
provided by groups with less than 20% private philanthropy (and 74% in health and 
human services).
We are not suggesting that nonprofit organizations should earn consistently large surpluses. 
After all, the organizations exist to pursue programs, not to build up internal resources. 
However, the profound under-capitalization and small scale of most organizations impedes 
necessary investments and makes prudent risk management all the more important. Yet, 
greater scale is not a panacea. For example, a large, well-run nonprofit organization with 
economies of scale might be able to earn a surplus of 1% on revenue in a typical year if it 
relies principally on government contracts. However, even after five years the resulting 
retained surplus would amount to less than three weeks of expenses. This is not enough to 
support appropriate investments in technology or infrastructure or to provide a cushion 
against unforeseen risks. Larger nonprofits typically have a lower proportion of revenue 
coming from private philanthropy. They are therefore more reliant on government contracts. 
Beyond a certain tipping point, even the most efficient organizations will not necessarily 
have sufficient private funds to offset the deficit from their government funding.
14 This is based on Guidestar data, which already excludes many organizations under $1.0 million, but this is not material to the 
distribution of service provision.
15 Again, excluding hospitals, higher education, nursing homes, FQHCs, etc.
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THE TRACK RECORD: HOW NONPROFITS HAVE DEALT 
WITH RISK
The sector’s overall fragility means that many nonprofits will experience financial distress. 
SeaChange and Oliver Wyman interviewed executive directors, board leaders, and funders 
of nonprofits that had struggled. Some went bankrupt. Others were rescued at the 11th hour 
by other organizations. Others “saw the writing on the wall” early enough to enter into an 
orderly merger or dissolution. Across the discussions, several themes emerged, as did some 
“worst practices.”
1. The organizations were fragile to begin with. Before the crisis hit they had limited 
resources and several years of deficits that had eroded whatever resources had once 
been in place.
2. The organizations had a longstanding challenge in recruiting and retaining a strong 
chief financial officer.
3. The crisis was precipitated by an event: the departure of the executive director; 
the non-renewal of an important funder; a change in government priorities or in the 
nature of government funding; a very meaningful (25-50%+) increase in scale; a real 
estate project that was large compared to the operating budget; or the emergence of 
a contingent liability (e.g., a Medicaid audit).
4. The organizations failed to do explicit scenario planning despite facing inherently 
uncertain situations. They did not pay enough attention to contingencies and 
milestones. Organizations were surprised by crises that could have been foreseen.
5. Trustees were not made fully aware of important long-term trends in financial 
performance or the operating environment. Important trends were masked by 
an exclusive focus on annual budgets, and year-to-date and year-over-year 
“rearview mirror” comparisons.
6. Trustees did not get timely, actionable information at the appropriate level of detail 
(i.e., by contract, program, or project) before or during the early stages of the crisis.
7. Trustees took too long to realize that there was a problem and then delayed taking 
action even after they had decided it was necessary. Executive directors and trustees 
suffered from magical thinking, particularly with respect to fundraising.
While there is a risk of 20/20 hindsight, we believe that many of these struggling nonprofits 
would have fared better, with less disruption to clients, had they put in place some or all of 
our recommended practices.
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THE WILL TO ACT
Risk management does not guarantee survival. Consolidation, mergers and acquisitions, 
divestments, and orderly wind-downs are part of a vibrant nonprofit sector. However, it 
is tragic when distress causes an organization to lose the capacity to make wise choices. 
This can result in exposing vulnerable people to the risk of disrupted services. It can also 
mean that hardworking staff lose paychecks or pensions and that trustees are exposed to 
personal liability for unpaid payroll taxes, etc. And in bankruptcy, everybody loses as scarce 
philanthropic assets are squandered on transaction costs. Similarly tragic are “zombie” 
nonprofits that are too weak to provide effective or efficient services and use whatever 
resources they can muster for organizational survival.16
Unfortunately, distressed or zombie nonprofits have few options for recovery. Unlike 
for-profits, they cannot attract funders with reduced price, seniority, or other advantageous 
terms. Nor are there any specialized nonprofit turnaround funders to evaluate and assume 
financial risks. In fact, most private funders run at the first sign of trouble, creating a 
nonprofit version of a run on the bank. Their best hope, if trouble comes, is to hobble along. 
This can mean hollowing out the program, freezing salaries, reducing headcount, borrowing 
from vendors, using restricted cash for impermissible purposes, and begging existing 
supporters (including trustees) for support.
Trustees must strive to maximize the good that their organization does while managing 
its risks. Balancing these can be challenging because of the passion they feel for the 
organization and its mission. Nonprofits lack the indicators of organizational health that 
reach the directors of for-profit businesses, such as stock prices or credit spreads. 
They also lack outside parties like activist investors, rating agencies, stock market analysts, and 
short-sellers to encourage them to step back and take an objective view of the situation.17 
In this context, nonprofit trustees in leadership positions must ensure that well thought-
through risk management processes are in place. In a challenging operating environment, 
the status quo is no longer acceptable.
16 Since creditors cannot put a nonprofit into involuntary bankruptcy and many nonprofits are too small for creditors to bother with, 
the zombie state can continue for a protracted period.
17 Despite all the reporting that FEGS was forced to do for government agencies and funders, nobody saw its bankruptcy coming. In fact, 
we have never been able to ascertain what the government actually does with its most comprehensive financial report, the CFR. We 
suspect they do nothing with it as it is virtually incomprehensible.
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APPENDIX
Exhibit 1: Contains aggregated financial information, including revenues, expenses, and balance sheet information, 
for selected New York City-area nonprofit organizations for the five years, 2009-2013. The “Ratios” table at the 
bottom of the exhibit expresses selected balance sheet data (receivables, payables, cash, etc.) for the industry as 
a whole as a function of the industry’s monthly expenses. The “2.9” figure for the cash ratio in 2013, for example, 
indicates that in 2013, the members of the industry in aggregate held an amount of cash on their balance sheets 
equal to 2.9 months of their average expenses over the course of the year. 
 
The underlying financial data included in this exhibit, as well as the following appendix exhibits, were provided by 
GuideStar, the world’s largest provider of information on nonprofit organizations. The data covers a representative 
sample of approximately 1,335 nonprofits filing IRS Form 990s for which GuideStar has electronic data. This includes 
all organizations with revenue of $1.0 million of more in each reporting year from 2009-2013, as well as a small 
fraction of smaller ones. We have excluded hospitals, medical research, organizations working abroad, higher 
education, private schools, and churches. For comparability, we have also excluded organizations that did not report 
in at least four of the five years (in US$ 000s).
INCOME 
STATEMENT 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Revenue, gains and other support
Program revenues 
and fees for service
$ 5,223,278 42% $5,128,111 39% $5,402,443 39% $5,538,738 40% $5,570,411 38%
Contributions 
and foundations




$277,035 2% $270,560 2% $282,082 2% $283,274 2% $279,845 2%
Net gain (loss) from 
asset sales
($265,486) (2%) $214,608 2% $590,255 4% $551,110 4% $684,988 5%
Total Revenues, Gains 
and Other Support
$12,418,936 100% $13,039,293 100% $13,873,231 100% $13,971,793 100% $14,480,059 100%
Expenses
Program services $10,874,010 85% $10,897,413 85% $11,222,968 85% $11,368,302 85% $11,501,606 84%
Management 
and general
$1,444,021 11% $1,411,218 11% $1,470,241 11% $1,521,296 11% $1,567,507 12%
Fundraising $497,004 4% $493,230 4% $513,746 4% $532,348 4% $551,764 4%
Total 
supporting services
$1,941,025 15% $1,904,448 15% $1,983,987 15% $2,053,644 15% $2,119,271 16%
Total expenses $12,815,035 100% $12,801,861 100% $13,206,955 100% $13,421,947 100% $13,620,877 100%
Net Income ($396,099) (3%) $237,433 2% $666,277 5% $549,846 4% $859,183 6%
Other adjustments 
to net assets
($1,509,869) $841,774 $947,442 ($781,706) $1,079,639
Net Assets, beginning 
of year
$19,982,390 $18,141,074 $19,237,436 $20,907,277 $20,138,577
Net assets, end 
of year
$18,076,422 $19,220,281 $20,851,155 $20,675,417 $22,077,399
Program Economics
Program expenses $10,874,010 100% $10,897,413 100% $11,222,968 100% $11,368,302 100% $11,501,606 100%
Less: Program 
revenues and fees 
for service
($5,260,301) 48% ($5,182,084) 48% ($5,447,692) 49% ($5,595,041) 49% ($5,618,450) 49%
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BALANCE SHEET (SELECTED) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Assets (selected)
Cash and savings $3,146,439 $3,125,066 $3,270,493 $3,242,828 $3,321,957
Pledges, grants, loans and other 
receivables, net
$2,781,491 $2,733,467 $2,766,136 $2,612,081 $2,710,515
Accounts receivable (net) $1,294,345 $1,232,475 $1,326,965 $1,334,013 $1,502,303
Securities and investment programs $12,278,043 $13,048,281 $13,944,437 $13,912,682 $14,469,713
Intangible and other 
(incl. inventory)
$1,828,188 $2,279,656 $2,092,642 $2,268,351 $2,203,398
Fixed assets $6,614,600 $7,243,752 $7,895,163 $8,045,310 $7,933,579
Total assets $27,947,204 $29,664,130 $31,295,861 $31,419,309 $32,141,716
Liabilities (selected)
Accounts payable $2,734,847 $2,624,765 $2,737,697 $2,733,938 $2,751,513
Tax-exempt bond liabilities $1,477,375 $1,829,027 $2,034,056 $2,073,507 $2,065,011
Secured mortagages and 
notes payable
$2,953,587 $2,903,511 $2,445,458 $2,221,272 $1,838,371
Other liabilities $2,660,708 $3,070,052 $3,228,466 $3,731,593 $3,412,960
Total liabilities $9,806,734 $10,427,155 $10,445,512 $10,899,604 $10,068,607
Net assets (selected)
Unrestricted $9,494,266 $10,570,169 $10,813,341 $10,689,738 $11,447,120
Temporarily restricted $4,270,411 $4,189,961 $5,551,709 $5,410,933 $5,990,727
Permanently restricted 
(i.e, endowment)
$4,132,103 $4,180,165 $4,294,735 $4,404,275 $4,459,528
Total net assets $17,896,780 $18,940,295 $20,659,784 $20,504,946 $21,897,374
Total liabilities and net assets $27,703,514 $29,367,450 $31,105,296 $31,404,549 $31,965,981
RATIOS (MONTHS)
Receivables 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.5
Payables 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4
Cash 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.9
Unrestricted net assets 8.9 9.9 9.8 9.6 10.1
Operating reserves 2.0 2.4 3.1 3.4 3.6
Program-level 
philanthropy need




$1,444,021 13% $1,411,218 13% $1,470,241 13% $1,521,296 13% $1,567,507 14%
Pre-
philanthropy deficit
($7,057,730) 65% ($7,126,547) 65% ($7,245,516) 65% ($7,294,558) 64% ($7,450,662) 65%
Add: 
Net philanthropy
$6,694,534 62% $6,939,727 64% $7,085,934 63% $7,063,471 62% $7,378,443 64%
Operating 
surplus/(deficit)
($363,195) (3%) ($186,820) (2%) ($159,582) (1%) ($231,087) (2%) ($72,219) (1%)
Add: Gain/(loss) 
on investments and 
asset sales
($32,903) (0%) $424,253 4% $825,858 7% $780,933 7% $931,402 8%
Net Income ($396,099) (4%) $237,433 2% $666,277 6% $549,846 5% $859,183 7%
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Exhibit 2: Indicates the percentage of nonprofits that are insolvent, meaning that their liabilities exceed their assets, 
by year, sector, and size bucket. The final table in the Exhibit drills down on the results for the industry sector with 
the highest insolvency rate, Health and Human Services. The final table indicates that the elevated insolvency rates 
observed in the HHS sector are not confined to the smallest nonprofits, but in fact exist at four of the five size buckets 
defined for the purposes of this study. 
 
NYC Nonprofit Insolvency Indicators.*
INSOLVENCY: LIABILITIES ARE GREATER THAN ASSETS
Percentage of nonprofits that are insolvent by 
major industry group and year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
1. Community capacity 8% 7% 7% 7% 8% 7%
2. Health and human services 16% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%
3. Arts, culture and humanities 6% 7% 7% 8% 9% 7%
4. Education, science, technology and social sciences 5% 8% 6% 7% 8% 7%
5. Environment and animal-related 2% 6% 6% 2% 2% 4%
6. Youth development 5% 5% 7% 9% 10% 7%
7. Other 6% 6% 6% 6% 0% 5%
Total 10% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11%
Percentage of nonprofits that are insolvent by 
size and year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
1. Grassroots 6% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
2. Small safety net 11% 11% 12% 13% 13% 12%
3. Mid safety net 14% 14% 16% 15% 14% 14%
4. Large safety net 11% 13% 12% 12% 14% 12%
5. Economic engines 6% 7% 4% 4% 5% 5%
Total 10% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11%
Percentage of nonprofits that are insolvent by 
major industry group, size and year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
Heatlh and human services 16% 18% 18% 18% 18% 18%
1. Grassroots 10% 15% 15% 13% 14% 13%
2. Small safety net 22% 23% 23% 25% 24% 23%
3. Mid safety net 13% 15% 18% 17% 16% 16%
4. Large safety net 14% 15% 15% 16% 19% 16%
5. Economic engines 10% 10% 5% 5% 5% 7%
 
*  Nonprofit size categories are as follows: Grassroots, <$1 million; Small Safety Net, between $1-$5 million; Mid Safety Net, between $5-$10 million; Large Safety Net,   
    between $10-$50 million; Economic Engines, >$50 million.
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Exhibit 3: Shows the months of different forms of financial reserves that nonprofit organizations (both generally 
and in the HHS sector specifically) hold, by decile. For example, the top table indicates that the bottom 10% of all 
nonprofits hold cash reserves equal to 0.3 months of expenses (or a little more than a week), while the top 10% 
(or 90th percentile) hold cash reserves equal to 12.5 months of expenses (or slightly over a year).  
 
NYC nonprofit Liquidity/Debt ratios (2013).
MONTHS OF RESERVES BY TYPE
Aggregate 
Distribution (2013) 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
1. Cash 0.3 0.8 1.4 1.9 2.6 3.7 5.0 7.3 12.5
2. Unrestricted net assets* -1.0 0.0 1.1 2.7 4.2 6.5 10.3 16.3 38.8
3. Operating -3.7 -0.3 0.3 1.4 2.8 4.4 6.7 11.1 24.8
4. Investments 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.6 2.5 3.7 6.0 10.0 21.2
5. Cash and investments 1.0 1.9 3.2 4.8 7.3 10.7 16.3 28.4 62.7
Health and human services 
distribution (2013) 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
1. Cash 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.5 2.0 2.7 3.9 6.4 10.5
2. Unrestricted net assets* -4.4 -0.2 0.3 1.5 3.0 4.7 7.6 12.2 28.0
3. Operating -10.1 -1.9 0.0 0.6 1.8 3.2 5.0 8.5 22.6
4. Investments 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.5 2.4 3.9 7.0 13.2
5. Cash and investments 0.8 1.4 2.2 3.2 4.7 6.8 10.9 18.9 49.3
 
*  Unrestricted net assets is an equity proxy.
Exhibit 4: Shows average three year profitability margin, defined as net income/total revenue, by decile by sector 
and size bucket. The results indicate that roughly 30% to 40% of nonprofits have been unprofitable over the period. 
The bottom table demonstrates that, if the proceeds of asset sales and investment income are excluded and margin 
is measured purely on the basis of normal operating revenues, roughly 50% of nonprofits are unprofitable, across all 
sectors and size buckets.  
 
NYC nonprofit marginal analysis (2013).
3 YEARS AVERAGE MARGIN (NET INCOME/TOTAL REVENUE)
Distribution (2013) 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
1. Community capacity -29.7% -11.6% -5.2% -1.2% 0.5% 2.2% 4.5% 8.3% 13.2%
2. Health and human services -19.6% -7.3% -3.3% -0.5% 0.4% 1.7% 4.3% 8.2% 18.6%
3. Arts, culture 
and humanities
-24.6% -10.0% -3.9% -1.5% 1.5% 3.7% 7.6% 13.9% 25.7%
4. Education, science, 
technology and 
social sciences
-28.2% -7.5% -3.0% 0.7% 3.7% 6.9% 11.6% 16.4% 32.5%
5. Environment and 
animal-related
-20.5% -11.1% -4.9% -0.4% 2.7% 5.7% 9.2% 13.2% 25.4%
6. Youth developement -18.3% -10.4% -5.9% -2.5% 2.4% 6.4% 8.9% 18.6% 28.1%
7. Other -37.7% -14.8% -1.3% 5.0% 5.8% 8.3% 9.3% 12.8% 16.2%
-23.9% -9.4% -3.9% -0.8% 1.0% 3.2% 6.3% 11.5% 21.7%
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1. Grassroots -58.4% -20.0% -9.1% -3.4% 1.4% 5.6% 8.8% 17.1% 40.0%
2. Small safety net -20.4% -10.0% -4.7% -1.3% 0.7% 3.2% 6.4% 11.4% 19.7%
3. Mid safety net -17.4% -6.6% -2.7% -0.9% 0.4% 3.0% 5.1% 8.6% 16.1%
4. Large safety net -10.3% -4.1% -1.8% 0.2% 1.3% 2.2% 4.1% 8.4% 15.1%
5. Economic engines -1.3% 0.1% 0.5% 1.1% 2.0% 2.5% 5.0% 8.4% 15.9%
-23.9% -9.4% -3.9% -0.8% 1.0% 3.2% 6.3% 11.5% 21.7%
3 YEARS AVERAGE MARGIN (TOTAL EXPENSES BEFORE ASSET SALES AND INVESTMENT INCOME/TOTAL REVENUE)
Distribution (2013) 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
1. Community capacity -25.8% -12.0% -5.1% -1.9% 0.4% 1.6% 4.0% 9.1% 13.1%
2. Health and human services -28.4% -10.5% -4.8% -1.8% -1.0% 0.9% 2.6% 5.8% 16.3%
3. Arts, culture 
and humanities
-34.8% -18.0% -8.2% -4.0% -1.3% 1.5% 4.8% 11.6% 24.3%
4. Education, science, 
technology and 
social sciences
-35.1% -12.6% -4.6% -1.0% 0.9% 3.5% 7.1% 14.2% 22.9%
5. Environment and 
animal-related
-53.4% -13.5% -6.2% -1.6% 0.2% 2.9% 5.5% 12.9% 22.0%
6. Youth developement -28.8% -11.3% -6.6% -3.8% -0.8% 1.2% 7.2% 13.4% 27.5%
7. Other -38.2% -13.3% -4.3% 4.2% 4.9% 6.9% 8.1% 9.9% 16.4%
-33.3% -13.2% -5.9% -2.5% -0.1% 1.5% 4.0% 9.4% 18.9%
1. Grassroots -68.9% -27.7% -10.9% -3.6% 0.6% 3.6% 9.1% 15.5% 38.4%
2. Small safety net -27.9% -12.0% -6.1% -2.7% -0.3% 1.6% 4.2% 9.2% 17.7%
3. Mid safety net -26.1% -9.5% -5.0% -1.8% -0.3% 0.6% 3.6% 5.9% 12.4%
4. Large safety net -24.6% -7.3% -3.9% -1.5% 0.0% 1.1% 2.1% 4.9% 13.8%
5. Economic engines -20.4% -12.0% -5.6% -3.4% -1.4% 0.1% 0.7% 1.7% 4.3%
-33.3% -13.2% -5.9% -2.5% -0.1% 1.5% 4.0% 9.4% 18.9% 
Exhibit 5: Shows the distribution of nonprofits by size (as measured by expenditures, by sector by decile.) 
For example, the median nonprofit had expeditures of $2.4 millions.  
 
Distribution of nonprofit expenditure by size and sector (2013 functional expenses, in US$ 000s). 
DISTRIBUTION OF SPEND
Distribution (2013) 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
1. Community capacity $701 $1,036 $1,361 $1,819 $2,426 $3,410 $4,971 $8,476 $17,102 $38,410
2. Health and human services $537 $1,034 $1,552 $2,034 $2,926 $4,408 $8,268 $12,980 $32,001 $55,967
3. Arts, culture 
and humanities
$511 $839 $1,166 $1,484 $2,018 $2,624 $3,849 $6,217 $15,462 $40,217
4. Education, science, 
technology and 
social sciences
$566 $892 $1,220 $1,650 $2,224 $2,945 $5,208 $7,969 $15,042 $22,751
5. Environment and 
animal-related
$484 $1,112 $1,421 $1,706 $3,456 $4,905 $5,979 $8,985 $31,510 $93,187
6. Youth developement $550 $1,079 $1,416 $1,889 $2,398 $4,308 $6,255 $9,278 $13,512 $23,708
7. Other $961 $1,092 $1,409 $1,971 $2,178 $3,404 $5,465 $8,963 $24,002 $38,996
Entire sector $566 $966 $1,330 $1,762 $2,414 $3,533 $5,467 $9,511 $21,499 $45,824
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Exhibit 6: Shows the distribution of type of spend, by sector and by nonprofit size decile. For example, the largest 5% 
of nonprofits represented 51.2% of the spending. The smallest 50% of nonprofits represented 5.6% 
of the spending. 
 
Distribution of aggregate nonprofit expenditure by size and sector (2013 functional expenses, in US$ 000s).
AMOUNT OF SPEND
Distribution (2013) ≤10% 10%< x ≤20% 20%< x ≤30% 30%< x ≤40% 40%< x ≤50%
1. Community capacity $11,689 $19,382 $29,282 $35,780 $51,564
2. Health and human services $10,102 $37,022 $57,887 $78,171 $114,750
3. Arts, culture and humanities $9,220 $25,172 $35,639 $45,167 $62,708
4. Education, science, technology and 
social sciences
$3,429 $8,794 $12,326 $17,401 $23,635
5. Environment and 
animal-related
$1,112 $3,679 $6,350 $9,134 $11,986
6. Youth developement $2,296 $7,265 $10,070 $13,689 $17,481
7. Other $1,090 $2,084 $1,289 $3,402 $4,160
Entire sector $36,217 $102,131 $150,654 $201,824 $272,870
Percentage of entire sector 0.3% 0.7% 1.1% 1.5% 2.0%
AMOUNT OF SPEND
Distribution (2013) 50%< x ≤60% 60%< x ≤70% 70%< x ≤80% 80%< x ≤90% 90%< x ≤95% ≥95%
1. Community capacity $66,254 $97,123 $153,344 $295,542 $293,745 $1,100,983
2. Health and human services $166,784 $270,920 $463,517 $922,347 $980,423 $2,379,165
3. Arts, culture and humanities $81,761 $113,242 $176,421 $362,795 $446,192 $2,198,167
4. Education, science, technology and 
social sciences
$30,834 $48,200 $76,239 $122,829 $113,191 $516,403
5. Environment and 
animal-related
$20,104 $32,763 $37,118 $61,052 $171,600 $391,042
6. Youth developement $26,967 $42,388 $62,031 $90,244 $76,832 $251,441
7. Other $3,176 $8,394 $7,966 $23,496 $38,578 $40,667
Entire sector $386,347 $580,354 $955,848 $1,853,053 $2,110,060 $6,973,420
Percentage of entire sector 2.8% 4.3% 7.0% 13.6% 15.5% 51.2%
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Exhibit 7: Shows the portion of nonprofits’ revenues that are accounted for by philanthropy – by sector, size 
bucket, and decile. The results indicate that the while median nonprofit receives roughly 32% of its revenue from 
philanthropic sources, the median nonprofit in the health and human services sector receives only 9% of its revenue 
from philanthropy – highlighting this sector’s greater reliance on non-philanthropic, primarily governmental, 
sources of funding.  
 
Distribution of philanthropy as a percentage of gross total revenue by size and sector (2013).
Distribution (2013) 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
1. Community capacity 0.0% 0.4% 7.5% 20.7% 37.3% 59.3% 77.2% 87.5% 97.5%
2. Health and human services 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 2.8% 9.2% 19.2% 37.6% 64.0% 87.5%
3. Arts, culture 
and humanities
6.5% 15.3% 25.8% 37.6% 44.5% 53.1% 61.7% 73.9% 86.5%
4. Education, science, 
technology and 
social sciences
0.0% 1.3% 8.2% 17.5% 38.0% 53.1% 73.1% 89.3% 96.7%
5. Environment and 
animal-related
2.2% 14.8% 27.1% 45.0% 63.6% 77.3% 85.5% 93.6% 99.3%
6. Youth developement 0.0% 5.0.% 20.2% 34.4% 44.9% 59.2% 76.0% 85.7% 94.3%
7. Other 0.0% 3.5% 13.7% 20.0% 38.2% 68.7% 89.7% 93.4% 97.9%
0.0% 1.3% 7.4% 17.9% 32.1% 46.6% 62.4% 79.3% 93.7%
1. Grassroots 0.0% 1.7% 11.8% 30.3% 48.1% 67.4% 81.3% 90.1% 98.9%
2. Small safety net 0.0% 1.4% 9.0% 21.8% 38.1% 51.9% 63.8% 78.0% 92.2%
3. Mid safety net 0.0% 1.7% 6.1% 13.6% 23.2% 38.5% 56.5% 78.0% 90.2%
4. Large safety net 0.0% 0.5% 4.8% 11.2% 18.4% 23.0% 33.4% 49.0% 76.5%
5. Economic engines 0.1% 1.5% 3.9% 6.0% 14.8% 20.1% 28.4% 51.7% 74.5%
0.0% 1.3% 7.4% 17.9% 32.1% 46.6% 62.4% 79.3% 93.7%
Health and human services 
distribution (2013) 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
1. Grassroots 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 3.6% 16.3% 45.6% 71.2% 83.7% 99.5%
2. Small safety net 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 2.4% 9.9% 21.8% 48.8% 68.4% 88.7%
3. Mid safety net 0.0% 0.1% 1.0% 2.8% 6.1% 13.5% 31.5% 58.2% 86.6%
4. Large safety net 0.0% 0.2% 0.6% 4.8% 10.5% 17.6% 22.3% 30.4% 57.5%
5. Economic engines 0.1% 0.7% 1.3% 2.7% 3.5% 4.6% 6.0% 12.4% 35.6%
0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 2.8% 9.2% 19.2% 37.6% 64.0% 87.5%
15
Exhibit 8: Shows similar information to Exhibit 7, but represents philanthropic revenue as a percentage of total 
functional spend by size bucket and decile. For example, organizations with 10% or less of private philantrophy 
represented 37.4% of total spending. 
 
Distribution of philanthropy revenue as a percentage of total nonprofit spend by size and sector (2013).
Distribution (2013) <10% <20% <30% <40% <50% <60% <70% <80% <90%
1. Community capacity 39.3% 53.3% 59.0% 70.9% 73.3% 74.5% 76.5% 82.8% 94.8%
2. Health and human services 65.1% 73.5% 81.9% 83.7% 87.4% 89.6% 91.0% 92.5% 95.8%
3. Arts, culture 
and humanities
6.0% 31.3% 51.5% 62.2% 80.1% 86.5% 89.9% 94.1% 97.9%
4. Education, science, 
technology and 
social sciences
29.1% 66.5% 72.1% 79.2% 81.9% 84.5% 87.5% 89.8% 90.7%
5. Environment and 
animal-related
3.6% 12.8% 15.0% 21.8% 22.5% 22.5% 59.4% 90.0% 91.8%
6. Youth developement 24.7% 38.8% 54.5% 73.5% 75.4% 81.1% 81.5% 87.2% 92.6%
7. Other 6.9% 15.3% 45.6% 48.0% 50.6% 50.6% 50.6% 50.6% 62.7%
Entire sector 37.4% 53.4% 64.5% 71.6% 78.5% 81.6% 85.6% 90.4% 95.1%
1. Grassroots 25.6% 31.2% 36.1% 40.2% 48.9% 52.6% 59.8% 67.8% 80.6%
2. Small safety net 29.1% 38.3% 45.9% 51.8% 59.4% 66.8% 73.2% 81.3% 88.4%
3. Mid safety net 33.1% 44.5% 50.2% 58.8% 67.0% 71.9% 74.1% 80.4% 89.4%
4. Large safety net 39.5% 52.3% 64.9% 74.8% 81.5% 85.8% 87.4% 88.9% 95.2%
5. Economic engines 39.2% 60.2% 72.4% 77.7% 84.2% 85.3% 90.5% 96.2% 98.2%
Entire sector 37.4% 53.4% 64.5% 71.6% 78.5% 81.6% 85.6% 90.4% 95.1%
Health and human services 
distribution (2013) <10% <20% <30% <40% <50% <60% <70% <80% <90%
1. Grassroots 43.0% 50.7% 54.1% 54.1% 57.6% 62.6% 64.6% 75.8% 81.9%
2. Small safety net 47.2% 55.8% 65.8% 69.7% 71.6% 75.3% 79.2% 84.6% 90.2%
3. Mid safety net 52.0% 64.4% 66.2% 71.8% 77.6% 81.4% 82.6% 87.4% 98.5%
4. Large safety net 55.2% 67.2% 80.9% 83.5% 87.3% 91.5% 93.9% 95.4% 97.0%
5. Economic engines 79.4% 84.0% 89.4% 89.4% 93.0% 93.0% 93.0% 93.0% 95.6%
Entire HHS sector 65.1% 73.5% 81.9% 83.7% 87.4% 89.6% 91.0% 92.5% 95.8%
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